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On September 13, 2005, workers from China, Bangladesh, Indonesia,
Swaziland, and Nicaragua sued Wal-Mart in Superior Court in Los Angeles
for breach of contract as third-party beneficiaries to Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.'s
supply contract with garment factories located in those respective
countries.' The suit, brought by the International Labor Rights Fund
("ILRF"), makes the novel claim that Wal-Mart's Standards for Suppliers
Agreement, also known as the Code of Conduct, created contractual
obligations between it and potentially hundreds of thousands of workers
employed by Wal-Mart's foreign suppliers who had agreed to comply with
the Code of Conduct.2
Wal-Mart's Code of Conduct sets forth five standards relating to
compliance with applicable law and practices, employment conditions,
workplace environment, concern for environment, factory inspection, and
Wal-Mart's gift and gratuity policy.3 Wal-Mart's supply contract requires
that the foreign suppliers in the identified countries producing goods for
Wal-Mart adhere to Wal-Mart's Code of Conduct as a direct condition of
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Northwestern University School of Law.
Class Action Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages, Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., No. CV 05-7307 GPS (C.D. Cal. 2005), available at http://www.laborrights.org
/projects/corporate/walmartlWalMartComplaint091305.pdf [hereinafter Complaint].
2 Steven Greenhouse, Suit Says Wal-Mart is Lax on Labor Abuses Overseas, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 14, 2005, at C3.
3Id.
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supplying merchandise to Wal-Mart. In addition, Wal-Mart asks suppliers
to sign the Code of Conduct for Wal-Mart's records and to display a poster
version of the Code of Conduct in the local language and English in each
production facility servicing Wal-Mart. The suit alleges that Wal-Mart was
in turn "obligated to ensure supplier compliance with its Code of Conduct,
and adequately monitor working conditions in supplier factories." 5
Workers claim that because Wal-Mart failed to leverage its "economic
position and actual control over supplier factories," the workers were
subject to employment conditions that violated the Code of Conduct.6 The
suit outlines eight causes of action brought on behalf of the foreign
workers: (1) Breach of Contract for Denial of Minimum and Overtime
Wages, (2) Breach of Contract for Forced Labor, (3) Breach of Contract for
Denial of Fundamental Right to Freely Associate, (4) Negligence and
Recklessness, (5) Negligence Per Se, (6) Negligent Hiring and Supervision,
(7) Unjust Enrichment and Violation of Business, and (8) Professions Code
§ 17200. 7 The ILRF, who brought the suit on behalf of the workers,
outlines the workers' demands. According to the ILRF, the workers
demand that Wal-Mart enforce its Code of Conduct, create a dispute
resolution system by which workers could air their grievances, reform its
pricing practices to ensure that the prices provided to suppliers would still
allow workers to receive the benefits of Wal-Mart's Code of Conduct, and
provide workers with restitution and a commitment to sourcing from union
shops and worker co-ops worldwide.8
In recent years, the apparel and garment industry has experienced
increased criticism and scrutiny due to allegations of sweatshop labor
conditions, unfair wages, unreasonable hours, unsafe working conditions,
and physical or mental abuse of workers.9 Some of these criticisms resulted
in lawsuits brought against multiple garment manufacturers, including
J.Crew, Gap, Tommy Hilfiger, and Wal-Mart. I0 Wal-Mart settled a 1999
4 Wal-Mart Standards for Suppliers, (Jan. 10, 2005), http://walmartstores.com/Files/
SupplierStandards.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2006) [hereinafter Code of Conduct].
5 Complaint, supra note 1, at 1.
6 id.
7 Id. at 34-43. This comment will only discuss the breach of contract claims in causes I-
3.
8 International Labor Rights Fund, Wal-Mart Worker's Demands,
http://www.laborrights.org/ (follow "Hot off the Presses ... Wal-Mart in China: Rolling
Back Labor Rights: Report" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 21, 2006).
9 See Seth Faison, Stretching Federal Labor Law Far into South Pacific, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 1999, at A3 (discussing the suit brought by workers in Saipan); see also Lisa Girion,
1780 Law Acquires Human Rights Role: Alien Tort Claims Act is the Basis for Suit Against
Unocal Over Abuses in Myanmar, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 2003, at A4.
1o Steven Greenhouse, 4 Companies Gain Accord in Labor Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10,
1999, at A 10 (discussing the lawsuit brought by workers in the Northern Mariana Islands).
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lawsuit brought by workers in the Northern Mariana Islands out of court for
an undisclosed amount. For many multi-national corporations, internally
created codes of conduct are seen as a way not only to self-regulate, but
also to bolster their image and reputation among consumers and
shareholders with respect to foreign business practices as a means to
counter such criticisms and lawsuits." Although "[i]ndividual corporate
codes of conduct vary from brief, value policy statements to comprehensive
guidelines.., the uniform policy behind them is to show the [multi-
national corporation's] support for the labor rights of workers."'
12
Historically, the main criticism levied against codes of conduct stems from
the prior notion that they are self-imposed and voluntary, and thus lack a
hard enforcement mechanism. According to Terry Collingsworth, ILRF's
general counsel, the premise of the current lawsuit against Wal-Mart "is that
Wal-Mart and many other companies issued these codes of conduct as
public relations devices. They never expected that someone would take the
codes seriously and use it as an affirmative tool to actually make them do
what they promised to do."' 3 As a result, this case is likely to cause alarm
among MNCs, which have increasingly "relied on codes of conduct to
assert their commitment to socially responsible behavior without incurring
legal liability."'
14
This comment examines whether corporate codes of conduct and more
specifically, Wal-Mart's Code of Conduct, are binding contracts between
foreign suppliers and their employees or whether they are voluntary and
non-contractual devices. An analysis of U.S. law and the text and
implementation of Wal-Mart's Code of Conduct reveals that the Code
should not be interpreted as a contract binding on foreign suppliers and
their employees for the breach of contract for denial of minimum and
overtime wages, the breach of contract for forced labor, and the breach of
contract for denial of the fundamental right to freely associate. The
comment goes on to discuss the ramifications of this type of suit and other
possibilities for bringing about the successful reform of labor conditions for
foreign workers. This comment concludes that the best means for reform is
not litigation but legislation. Part II of this comment discusses the historical
origins of corporate codes of conduct and the role that they currently play
within MNCs. Part III discusses how courts in the United States have
" Jane C. Hong, Enforcement of Corporate Codes of Conduct: Finding a Private Right
of Action for International Laborers Against MNCs for Labor Rights Violations, 19 WIs.
INT'L L.J. 41, 50 (2000-2001).
12 See id. at 52.
13 Keith Ecker, Labor Group Holds Wal-Mart to Code of Conduct, INSIDE COUNSEL,
(Nov. 2005), http://www.insidecounsel.com/issues/insidecounsel/15_168/circuits/224-1.html
(quoting Terry Collingsworth, Director International Labor Rights Fund).
14 Jonathan Birchall, Wal-Mart Faces Sweat-Shop Lawsuit, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at
15.
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interpreted corporate codes of conduct. Part IV analyzes the text and
implementation of Wal-Mart's Code of Conduct and determines whether it
should be interpreted as a contract or mere guidelines in light of recent
court rulings. Part V analyzes the impact of the lawsuit and discusses the
appropriateness of other possible means for reforming foreign working
conditions. Part VI draws conclusions with respect to the most effective
means of impacting workers' conditions, such as grassroot efforts.
II. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL
CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT AND THEIR ROLE WITHIN
MULTI-NATIONAL CORPORATIONS
MNCs use "corporate codes of conduct" to set out ethical standards in
their conduct. For the most part, MNCs that adopt codes of conduct
voluntarily create a written pledge or establish standards to respect labor
rights outlined in the code. Underlying these codes is a fundamental
premise: that "corporations, due to their dominance as global institutions,
should address the social and environmental problems affecting
humankind." 15
A. Internal Codes of Conduct
International corporations in the 1970s put forth the first wave of
corporate codes of conduct, "which focused generally on principles of
honesty and fair dealing as a response to developing countries' fears of
abuse and exploitation by multi-national corporations."1 6 Among the first
companies to formulate corporate codes of conduct were General Electric
and Martin Marietta in the 1980s.17  Procurement scandals generated
widespread interest in corporate conduct.' 8 However, it was not until the
enactment in 1991 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which provided
potential monetary incentives for companies that instituted ethics programs,
that U.S. companies began establishing codes of conduct with more
frequency.19 Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, a company could gain
some leniency in sentencing based on several "mitigating factors,"
including, but not limited to, having a program "to prevent and detect
15 Hong, supra note 11, at 42.
16 Developments in the Law-Jobs and Borders: III. Legal Tools for Altering Labor
Conditions Abroad, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2202, 2220 (2005) [hereinafter Developments in the
Law-Jobs and Borders] (referring to GEORGE TSOGAS, LABOR REGULATION IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 60 (2001)).
"7 Id. at 2181.
18 Id.
9 International Labour Organization, Corporate Codes of Conduct,





violations of the law." 20 The Guidelines detail seven criteria by which such
programs will be judged, including: the existence of standards or codes of
conduct, training or other communication regarding standards, and the
designation of a high-level individual to oversee compliance.2' Consumer
concerns and the potential for media exposure of substandard labor
conditions in MNCs' global supply chains also motivated this second wave
of codes of conduct. Moreover, codes of conduct arose either as a direct
result of private campaigns or in anticipation of such campaigns.
Companies saw codes of conduct as a means to garner public favor by
appearing as if they were cleaning up their acts.22 Whereas in the past, a
company might have been able to keep unethical behavior quiet, now a
greater likelihood exists that company employees or a nongovernmental
organization ("NGO") watch group will alert relevant pressure groups of a
company's unethical behavior.
Levi-Strauss's Code of Conduct, the first of its kind, emerged after the
change in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and as a result of public pressure.
Levi-Strauss was the first MNC to institute a comprehensive corporate
Code of Conduct in 1991.23 The Code addresses seven aspects of
employment: wages and benefits, working hours, child labor, forced labor,
health and safety, discrimination, and disciplinary practices.24 Personnel
from Levi-Strauss monitor compliance with the Code through the use of
questionnaires, audits, and surprise visits. In addition, Levi-Strauss
participates in the Ethical Trading Initiative, an alliance of companies and
NGOs that seeks to promote and implement corporate codes of conduct.25
As of 2000, Levi-Strauss had discontinued contracts with thirty-five of
approximately 700 subcontractors due to repeated Code violations.
Wal-Mart's own Code of Conduct was developed in 1992, arguably in
reaction to the sweatshop allegations involving clothing manufactured as
part of the Kathie Lee Gifford clothing line.26 At its inception, the Code
was to apply to all suppliers both nationally and internationally. 27 The
Code of Conduct, whose elements were discussed earlier, was meant to be
20 United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 482-84,
available at http://www.ussc.gov (follow "Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual and
Appendices (2006)" hyperlink).
21 id.
22 INGEBJORG DARSOW, IMPLEMENTATION OF ETHICS CODES IN GERMANY: THE WAL-
MART CASE (Mar. 2005), http://upf.edu/iuslabor/032005/artll.htm (last visited Jan. 30,
2007).
23 Levi Strauss, Social Responsibility/Social Guidelines, http://www.levistrauss.com/
responsibility/conduct! (last visited Nov. 21, 2005).
24 Id.
25 id.
26 Complaint, supra note 1, at 13.
27 id.
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incorporated into its supply contracts with foreign suppliers.28 Although the
Code has undergone numerous revisions since 1992, all of the versions
claim to extend fundamental rights to workers in Wal-Mart supplier
factories.29
Internal codes of conduct put forth voluntarily are not the only codes
of conduct present in the global arena. There are also external codes of
conduct by which some companies abide. External codes of conduct
typically fall into the following two categories: (1) those created in
multilateral government settings, and (2) those created by either single
governments or by NGOs. 30 The United Nations or the International Labor
Organization ("ILO") usually create the codes in the former category. The
ILO is a specialized agency of the United Nations that "seeks the promotion
of social justice and internationally recognized human and labour rights. 31
However, an ILO convention only binds ratifying states and many countries
have refused to ratify it. Even though the United States has agreed to ratify
it, the ILO has little power to enforce its conventions.32 Of the latter type of
external codes, one of the most prevalent in the apparel industry is the
Apparel Industry Partnership ("ALP"), formed in 1996 under the direction
of then-President Clinton. The AIP is a coalition of footwear and apparel
industry members, labor unions, NGOs, religious groups, and consumer
groups that formulates common labor standards and common monitorin
and enforcement mechanisms for MNCs' subsidiaries and subcontractors.
Critics of AlP, such as Sweatshop Watch, have been most critical of its
Principles of Monitoring because they fail to provide effective monitoring
and the rules add little weight to those already in place by the U.S.
Department of Labor.34 Moreover, there is no neutral party to "blow the
whistle on human rights violations" and therefore, no assurance that
monitors will not be unduly influenced by corporate pressure on inspection




30 Hong, supra note 11, at 50.
3 1 Director-General: Mr. Juan Somavia, International Labour Organization,
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/index.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2006).
32 Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, Enforcing International Labor Rights
Through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663, 665 (1995).
33 International Labour Organization, Apparel Industry Partnership's Agreement, (Apr.
14, 1997), http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/teleam/global/ilo/guide/apparell.htm (last
visited Nov. 13, 2006).
34 Heidi S. Bloomfield, "Sweating" the International Garment Industry: A Critique of
the Presidential Task Force's Workplace Codes of Conduct and Monitoring System, 22
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 567, 584 (1999).
" Id. at 584-85.
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B. External Codes of Conduct
Compared to internal codes of conduct many of the external codes of
conduct discussed in the previous section have not done well to recruit
participation by companies. MNCs are reluctant to declare their support for
such broad and overly general approaches.36 Instead, companies are inclined
to take a more proactive and self-motivated approach in which they create
their own rules and regulations in an internal corporate code of conduct.
Unfortunately, corporate codes of conduct are not without their critics.
Historically the main criticism of codes of conduct was that they were self-
imposed, self-regulated, and voluntary, and thus lacked a definitive
enforcement mechanism.3 7 For most companies, the primary incentive to
comply with a code of conduct was to avoid negative attention and harm to
their public image. After all, companies like Levi-Strauss, Nike, and Wal-
Mart logically want to avoid lawsuits and repeated images of sweatshop
laborers making their apparel on the evening news. Ultimately, the "conflict
that each company faces is one between striving to set a higher standard for
human and labor rights, and the criticism it will face for falling short of the
higher standard.
38
III. HOW COURTS INTERPRET CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT
In order to determine whether or not Wal-Mart's Code of Conduct
could be interpreted as establishing a contractual obligation to employees of
foreign suppliers, it is necessary to evaluate how codes of conduct are
interpreted. Recently, a federal district court in the Northern District of
Illinois laid out a framework under which employer codes of conduct would
be considered contractually binding.39 The court determined that in order
for an employee handbook or other employment policies, such as a code of
conduct, to create enforceable contractual rights, the language of the policy
must conform to the traditional requirements of contract formation.
Therefore, the code of conduct must:
First, contain a promise clear enough that an employee would
reasonably believe that an offer has been made. Second, the
statement must be disseminated to the employee in such a manner
that the employee is aware of its contents and reasonably believes it
to be an offer. Third, the employee must accept the offer by
commencing or continuing to work after learning of the policy
36 See Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, supra note 32, at 186.
37 Developments in the Law-Jobs and Borders, supra note 16, at 2220.
38 Ryan P. Toftoy, Now Playing: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the Global Theater. Is
Nike Just Doing It? 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 905, 917 (1998).
39 Weber Shandwick Worldwide v. Reid, No. 05 C 709, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 14482, at
"1- 13,*8 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2005).
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statement.
40
In determining that the disputed Code of Conduct, from the company
Weber Shandwick, was not a contract, the court pointed out that the Code
of Conduct did not contain clear promissory language. Rather, the Code's
use of the phrase "may result in disciplinary action" was just a general
statement of company policy or practice and was therefore too indefinite to
create a binding contractual obligation.41 Because Weber Shandwick's
Code of Conduct contained general statements of company policy and
guidelines for employer-employee conduct, it did not constitute a binding
contract. The court concluded that if the language had been more precise to
include phrasing like will result in disciplinary action, it would have been
considered precise enough.42 The court argued that "language that merely
gives examples of the kinds of conduct that subject an employer to
discharge does not amount to a contractual promise." Furthermore, when
the purpose of a handbook or code of conduct is not to confer rights, but to
warn employees about conduct that could result in termination or adverse
action, the language does not constitute a contract.44
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressed the
importance of looking at the specific language of the code of conduct when
determining whether or not it was a contract. In order for statements in
employment manuals and codes of conduct to be binding, the court ruled, in
an unreported case that they must "constitute promises of specific treatment
in specific situations, not merely policy statements. 45 As a result, the court
ruled that the statement contained in the manual, "Honeywell will make
every effort in terms of counseling employees whose work is
unsatisfactory," did not constitute a specific promise because it did not
provide "detailed or specific procedure to be followed prior to terminating
an employee. ' ' 6 In determining that the language was too vague, the court
focused on the specific term "make every effort" to infer that under some
circumstances "every effort" mi'ht mean that there is still nothing that can
be done to prevent termination. 4
40 Id. at *9 (quoting Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314, 318
(Ill. 1987)).
41 Id. at *11.
42 See Id. (referencing Hicks v. Methodist Med. Ctr., 593 N.E.2d 119, 120 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992)).
43 Id. at *12.
44id.
45 Brinkley v. Honeywell, Inc., No. 93-35402, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23834, at *1-10
(9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion) (quoting Stewart v. Chevron Chemical Co., 762 P.2d
1143 (Wash. 1988)).




The Ninth Circuit also laid out a framework by which employers can
escape contractual obligations for their employee codes of conduct.48
Employers can avoid contractual obligations if they "specifically state, in a
conspicuous manner that nothing contained therein is intended to be part of
the employment relationship and are simply general statements of company
policy. '49 However, if an employer promises specific treatment in specific
circumstances and an employee is induced thereby to remain on the job and
not actively seek alternative employment, those promises are enforceable as
contracts. 5 In the specific instance, the court conluded that the employer
was not bound by statements in an employment manual because the Code
of Conduct stated specifically that it was not "to be construed as limiting
[the employer's] right to terminate without cause. ''5 '
Although the courts have not specifically addressed a case where an
implied contract modified an at-will employment relationship, court
opinions still provide a framework from which inferences can be drawn to
decide whether an implied contract modified an at-will employment
relationship.52  Even if a worker cannot prove that an express contract
existed, a worker may be able to prove that a code of conduct established an
implied contract. This possibility might give some insight into how a court
would interpret whether a code of conduct created an implied contract with
an employee. To determine whether there is an implied contract, courts will
look at:
(1) length of service; (2) actions or communications by the employer
reflecting assurances of continued employment; (3) the employer's
personnel policies and practices; (4) whether the employee gave
independent consideration for the employer's promise; and (5)
practices in the industry in which the employee is engaged.53
Although the Ninth Circuit has ruled that statements must contain
promises of specific treatment for specific instances in order for a
contractual relationship to be created from employer codes of conduct,
some court decisions indicate that when an employer puts forth formal
personnel policies and procedures in codes of conduct, those policies and
procedures will be viewed as contractually binding. In Guz v. Bechtel
National, Inc., the California Supreme Court held that "when an employer
promulgates formal personnel policies and procedures in handbooks,
48 Laul v. Battelle Mem'l Inst., No. 95-35156, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 16520 (9th Cir.
June 14, 1996) (unpublished opinion).
49 Id. at *4 (quoting Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1084 (1984)).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See Reid v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 366 F. Supp. 2d 989, 994 (S.D. Cal. 2005).
" Id. at 995.
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manuals and memoranda disseminated to employees, a strong inference
may arise that the employe: intended workers to rely on these policies as
terms and conditions of their employment., 54  In Guz, the company's
written personnel documents were seen as contractually bindinA and
therefore modified the original conditions of the employee's contract.
In addition to rulings in the United States, a 2005 ruling in Wuppertal,
Germany by a local labour court offers some insight into whether codes of
conduct should be seen as contractually binding overseas. The court found
that the Code of Conduct given to Wal-Mart's employees in Germany,
which is similar to the one implemented in stores in the United States,
violated German labor laws.56  In February 2005, Wal-Mart's German
workers were given a thirty-three-page Code of Conduct attached to their
pay checks.57 In addition, all store managers were provided with a special
poster regarding the company's Code of Conduct. This poster was
supposed to go on permanent display in German Wal-Marts' Human
Resources departments. 58  The guidelines on ethics forced Wal-Mart's
employees to adhere to rules about behavior and their private and sexual
relationships. 59  One of the provisions of the company's Code for
employees forbids intimate relationships among co-workers and requires
employees to inform Wal-Mart via a telephone hotline if they suspect
violations.60 The German workers' council filed the suit against Wal-Mart
Germany in protest of the controversial provisions. The Local Labour
Court of Wuppertal ruled in favor of the employees.62 The Court ruled that
provisions in the Code violated the German Constitution and more
specifically German law, which says that anything regulating the personal
lives of employees should first be agreed upon between employers and
workers.63 In addition, the Court ruled that the Code breached the right of
co-determination because it required staff to report Code violations via a so-
called ethics hotline. 64 In order for the provisions to pass constitutional
54 Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1106 (Cal. 2000).
55 Id.




60 Press Release, United Food and Commercial Workers, Wal-Mart Imposes KGB Style-
Informant System on German Employees (Mar. 18, 2005), http://www.ufcw.org/press-room/
index.cfm?pressReleaselD=128; see also WakeupWalMart.com, Wal-Mart Imposes KGB
Style-Informant System on German Employees (Mar. 18, 2005)
http://wakeupwalmart.com/press/20050318b-release.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2006).






muster in Germany, the "works council" would have to agreed upon the
provisions.6 5
Even though the ruling was in Germany and not the United States, let
alone California where the complaint was filed, the ruling is important
because it shows that Wal-Mart considers its Code of Conduct to be binding
on employees. Thus, a violation of that Code can result in termination of
employment. For Wal-Mart employees in Germany, as well as the United
States, the Code of Conduct is not merely a suggestion, but a binding
obligation of employees when they accept the job. This obligation gives
insight into Wal-Mart's intent in creating a code of conduct for suppliers.
This case is also relevant because it shows a tendency for courts to see
codes of conduct, particularly ones that are distributed and displayed to
employees, as having some binding force on those employees. In addition,
codes are held to be illegal if they contain a clause that violates local law.
IV. SHOULD WAL-MART'S CODE OF CONDUCT BE INTERPRETED
AS A CONTRACT OR MERELY AS GUIDELINES?
In order to determine whether Wal-Mart's Code of Conduct for foreign
suppliers should be viewed as contractually binding, an analysis of the text
and implementation of Wal-Mart's Code of Conduct in light of recent court
rulings must take place. Based on recent court rulings, it seems that the
contractual determination will hinge on whether Wal-Mart's Code of
Conduct (1) made a promise clear enough for an offer; (2) was disseminated
in a manner that employees knew of its contents and reasonably relied on it;
and (3) whether employees accepted the offer either by commencing or
continuing to work.
Based on Wal-Mart's own admissions, it appears that the Code of
Conduct was disseminated in such a manner that employees knew of its
contents and reasonably relied on it. Wal-Mart's own "Supplier's
Responsibilities" make clear that Wal-Mart requires that a poster version of
the Supplier Standards in the local language and English be placed in each
production facility serving Wal-Mart. 66 The poster version has already been
translated into twenty-five languages.67 The filed complaint alleged that all
"plaintiffs either saw posted in the supplier factory or were otherwise made
aware of Wal-Mart's Code of Conduct and understood that the worker
rights protections contained therein ... were for their direct benefit."
68
Specifically for the Indonesian plaintiffs, the complaint alleges that Wal-
Mart's Code of Conduct is posted on the walls of factories in Indonesia, and
65 id.
66 Code of Conduct, supra note 4, at 25.
67 id.
68 Complaint, supra note 1, at 34.
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that one of the plaintiffs supervisors provided him a copy of the Code of
Conduct to "distribute to the employees for whom he served as foreman."
69
Even if the argument can be made that some of the workers did not see the
poster or were not provided with a copy of the Code of Conduct, by Wal-
Mart's own admission the Code was supposed to be distributed to all
employees. Therefore, it seems likely that the requirement for contract
formation was satisfied.
Similarly, because the plaintiffs in the complaint all continue to work
at Wal-Mart, it appears that there can be little debate about whether the
employees actually ever accepted their offer. Because they maintained their
employment, it seems that if the court rules that Wal-Mart indeed made an
offer, then acceptance was also made.
The primary issue in this case will likely center on whether Wal-
Mart's Code of Conduct was a promise clear enough to constitute an offer.
As courts have analyzed codes of conduct for general or specific terms,
70
the court will likely find that Wal-Mart's Code of Conduct is not a contract,
as long as the Code merely contains general statements of company policy
and guidelines for employer-employee conduct. Wal-Mart's Code of
Conduct says that Wal-Mart "reserves the right to make periodic,
unannounced inspections" and that "Wal-Mart will favor suppliers who
meet such industry practices.' Such language seems analogous to the
language in Shandwick where the court ruled that the code of conduct did
not create a contract because it was too general and seemed only to be a
general statement of company policy.
72
To determine if the language created a contract, the court will also
look at whether the language merely gave examples of the types of conduct
that could result in disciplinary action. Wal-Mart's Code of Conduct says
that "failure to supply complete and accurate commercial invoices may
result in cancellation of orders."73 Because violation of Wal-Mart's Code
of Conduct is not an automatic bar from being a Wal-Mart supplier it seems
likely the Code just gives examples of the types of conduct that could result
in disciplinary action. If non-compliance with the Code were a direct bar
from being a Wal-Mart supplier, then perhaps the workers would have a
better argument that the Code was a binding contract. In addition, it could
be argued that the "will not" and "will" language is not an offer to
employees but merely a means to lay out for suppliers the type of activity
that can result in termination, and therefore, it is not an offer to confer a
right to workers. This line of reasoning seems more appropriate
69 Id. at 25.
70 See supra Part III.
71 Code of Conduct, supra note 4, at 26.
72 See Shandwick, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 14482, at *12.
73 Code of Conduct, supra note 4, at 26 (emphasis added).
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considering that suppliers are asked to sign the Code of Conduct, and it is
contained in the supplier contract. In this regard, the Code seems more like
suggested guidelines that merely put suppliers on notice, rather than a
binding contract that if violated would result in termination of the supply
relationship.
Despite those arguments in favor of not finding a contract, at times, the
Code contains clear promissory language similar to a contract. The Code of
Conduct states that "Wal-Mart will not accept products from suppliers who
directly or indirectly use in any manner forced labor or prison labor., 74 The
Code also states "[s]uppliers will respect the rights of employees regarding
their decision of whether to associate or not to associate with any group, as
long as such groups are legal in their own country. 75 That precise and
absolute phrasing appears to be the type of phrasing that the court in
Shandwick said would create a contract.
While the court could follow Shandwick and find a contract, the court
could also conclude that the language is not precise enough to form a
contract. The language in the "Forced Labor/Prison Labor" and "Freedom
of Association and Collective Bargaining" section of Wal-Mart's Code of
Conduct is not precise enough to constitute a contract because, similar to
Honeywell, Wal-Mart's language leaves too much room for interpretation.7 6
The Code of Conduct merely states that "Wal-Mart will not accept products
from suppliers who directly or indirectly use in any manner forced labor or
prison labor" and that "suppliers will respect the rights of employees. 7 7
Under the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Honeywell, this phrasing does not seem
to be a contract because the code's phrasing has numerous possible
interpretations. The "Forced Labor/Prison Labor" section simply says
"[florced or prison labor will not be tolerated," but provides no groundwork
for what that means and what actions Wal-Mart will take if there is a
violation of the provision.78 Furthermore, the phrase "will respect" under
the "Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining" also is too vague.
The sections do not lay out specific requirements or actions. The phrasing
in the sections offers no guidance as to how the company must go about
respecting a worker's rights. As a result, Wal-Mart can make the claim that
the wording is too vague to be interpreted as a contract under the standards
set forth by the court in Honeywell.
Moreover, Wal-Mart could successfully argue that the sections were
not intended to confer a right on the employees of foreign suppliers, but
were simply intended as examples of conduct that may result in termination
74 Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
75 Id. (emphasis added).
76 Honeywell, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23834, at *47.
77 Code of Conduct, supra note 4, at 27.
78 Id.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 27:453 (2007)
of the supplier contract. The reasoning against these sections forming a
contract seems to be stronger because the wording that "Wal-Mart will not
accept products" and "[s]uppliers will respect" seems to be more of a
warning to suppliers rather than a right conferred on the supplier's
workers.79 As a result, Wal-Mart's Code of Conduct should not be viewed
as contractually binding in the context of "Forced Labor/Prison Labor" and
"Freedom of Association," but should merely be seen as non-contractual
guidelines for suppliers to follow.
Although Wal-Mart's Code of Conduct does not create a contract
regarding "suppliers" and "products," the question still remains whether the
Code confers rights to employees with respect to "Compensation." The
Code of Conduct Compensation section under "Employment Conditions"
states that:
Suppliers shall fairly compensate their employees by providing
wages and benefits that are in compliance with the local and national
laws of the jurisdictions in which the suppliers are doing business or
which are consistent with the prevailing local standards in the
country if the prevailing local standard is higher.
8 0
The word "shall" appears to confer a right on workers. However, like
the "Forced Labor/Prison Labor" and "Freedom of Association and
Collective Bargaining" sections, this section also seems directed at
suppliers and not at workers. The language is precise and does not contain
any suggestion that might be construed as only giving an example of
conduct that could lead to punishment. Nonetheless, because the language
of the section seems to give an example of the type of conduct that could
lead to negative consequences for suppliers, it also does not seem to confer
a contractual right. Perhaps if the section stated that "all employees shall be
fairly compensated" or that "employees have a right to fair compensation,"
then this section could be seen as containing a contractual right. Unlike the
Code of Conduct in Germany that was specifically directed at Wal-Mart's
employees and their permitted conduct, the Code of Conduct for foreign
suppliers seems solely directed at the supplier's conduct. As is, this is not a
promise for specific treatment, but yet another mention of the optimum
working environment that Wal-Mart wants from its suppliers and the type
of conduct, if violated, that could result in termination of the foreign
supplier's contract.
Most likely, the foreign workers will still assert that the Code creates
an implied contract with workers because it is visibly displayed in the
factory and personally distributed to each individual worker, and therefore
79 Id.
80 Id. (emphasis added).
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Wal-Mart intends for it to be binding upon workers. The code, however,
makes no guarantees of enforcement to workers. The Code states, "[a]ny
person with knowledge of a violation of any of these practices by a
Supplier, factory or a Wal-Mart associate should call the appropriate
number." 8' In light of the German court's ruling, the workers may assert
that the Code was an implied contract. 82 However, the German employee
Code and the foreign supplier Code are not analogous. The German
employee Code outlined specific rules that the employees must follow or
they would be terminated. 3 In contrast, violation of the foreign supplier
Code does not necessarily warrant termination of the supplier relationship.
84
The specifications in the German Code were detailed and elaborate, rather
than the general provisions detailed in the supplier contract. 85 Wal-Mart
will likely assert that this language implies not that there is an implied
contract between Wal-Mart and the employees, but merely that employees
are given the contract to support Wal-Mart in enforcing the code. Even if
an employee did report a violation, Wal-Mart is not under any obligation to
then terminate the supplier relationship. Moreover, the Code does not
outline any specific remedies, even in the event that an employee reports a
violation. Therefore, it does not appear that the posting and distribution of
the Code necessarily create an implied contract with employees.
Even if foreign workers assert that the Code of Conduct creates an
implied contract, their claim would likely fail because the court would look
at the practice in the industry. 86 As noted in Part II, supra, MNCs have
historically adopted codes of conduct voluntarily, using them as guidelines
for suppliers, employees, and executives. Until now, employees of foreign
suppliers had not alleged that a code of conduct created a contractual
obligation. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the Wal-Mart Code of
Conduct created an implied contract, because it is unreasonable to think that
the practice in the industry is for codes of conduct to be contractually
binding.
Ultimately, because the wording in Wal-Mart's Code of Conduct is too
vague and merely gives examples of the type of conduct that could result in
disciplinary action by Wal-Mart rather than confers a right on workers,
Wal-Mart's Code of Conduct for foreign suppliers does not create a
contractual obligation with the employees of Wal-Mart's foreign suppliers.
81 Id. at 29.
82 See Code of Conduct, supra note 4.
83 See DARSOW, supra note 22.
84 See Code of Conduct, supra note 4.
85 Id.
86 See Reid v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 366 F. Supp. 2d at 994-95.
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V. THE IMPACT OF THE LAWSUIT AND APPROPRIATENESS OF
OTHER MEANS FOR REFORMING FOREIGN WORKING
CONDITIONS
Although a California court will eventually answer the debate over
whether corporate codes of conduct can be contractually binding, the
question remains as to what the most effective means are for bringing about
positive changes in the working conditions of foreign workers. In recent
years, foreign workers have been successful using civil litigation against
MNCs to bring about changes in workers' conditions. For example, in the
mid-1990s, U.S. human rights groups filed suit against Unocal Corp. for
alleged human rights violations against Burmese villagers, including
torture, rape, and murder to enslave villagers, even throwing one woman's
baby in a fire after killing her husband . After years of courtroom sparring
with pipeline workers over whether Unocal had acquiesced in or benefited
from human rights violations committed by the Burmese government,
Unocal agreed to pay workers a $30 million settlement. 88 The case hinged
largely on the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"),8 9 that allows foreign
litigants to seek damages in U.S. court for crimes against the law of
nations. 90 The ATCA provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."9 1 The ILRF,
the same group behind the Wal-Mart class action discussed in this
comment, represented the plaintiffs against Unocal. Although the case
against Unocal was ultimately successful, it took years to litigate and did
not necessarily create proactive change.
In addition to cost and time constraints, pursuing suits against
manufacturing firms under the ATCA may be less successful because no
U.S. court has recognized international labor standards as binding
international law. However, if employers treat their workers violently, fail
to pay them, coerce them into working, or restrain them, then these human
rights abuses could be subject to ATCA jurisdiction.92 It appears, therefore,
that a set of labor rights have emerged "that seem to be gaining general
recognition and acceptance throughout the world. 93 In light of the trend to
87 Paul Magnusson, A Milestone for Human Rights, Bus. WK., Jan. 24, 2005, at 63.
88 id.
89 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
90 Magnusson, supra note 87, at 44.
9' 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
92 See Magnusson, supra note 87.
93 Hong, supra note 11, at 68.
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interpret the ATCA more expansively, observers theorize that future courts
may be willing to consider the labor rights promulgated in corporate codes
of conduct as binding international norms.
94
Proponents of litigation strategies could point out the changes that
some companies institute simply as a reaction to litigation. Just over a
month after the complaint in question was filed, Wal-Mart CEO H. Lee
Scott, Jr. told suppliers at a business conference that Wal-Mart would start
holding suppliers more accountable for environmental and social standards
at foreign factories as public expectations in the United States rise.95 In
speaking to the conference of suppliers, Scott stated, "Are you running your
factories in a way that promotes environmental sustainability? Are you
sourcing from people that causes there to be inclusion and opportunity for
women and minority-owned businesses... ? You'll see Wal-Mart making
a stronger stand over the next several months in these areas. 96 Scott also
reassured suppliers that he would fly to Shanghai to visit Wal-Mart's fast-
growing store operations in China.97
Scott's comments reflect why litigation strategies are more appealing
than traditional grass-roots approaches. In theory, the mere filing of a
complaint prompted Wal-Mart's CEO to make public statements assuring
that Wal-Mart would hold suppliers more accountable. The complaint
points a spotlight at a perceived problem that company officials must then
address. Commentators are skeptical that public assurances, such as the one
given by Scott, are actually legitimate rather than just sound bites. 98 For
that reason, activists such as Paul Blank, the director of Wake-Up Wal-
Mart, insist that they are "building a sea of public pressure to force Wal-
Mart to end its race-to-the-bottom business model." 99 Even if the class
action discussed in this comment is dismissed, the ILRF wins because the
lawsuit motivates, if not forces, Wal-Mart to reform to avoid criticism by
the court of public and private opinion. After all, when the lawsuit was
filed it appeared in major newspapers across the country.'0 0 Wal-Mart's
response to the suit, as well as Blank's criticism of Wal-Mart's response,
also made headlines.10 1 The mere lodging of allegations in the complaint
94 id.
95 Wal-Mart to Press Its Manufacturers, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2005, at C3.
96 id.
97 Id.
98 Marcus Kabel, Wal-Mart to Toughen Overseas Standards, L.A. TIMES ONLINE, Oct.
20, 2005, http://www.latimes.com/business/investing/wire/sns-ap-wal-martscott, l,3524478.
story ? coll=sns-ap-investing-headlines.
99 Wal-Mart to Press Its Manufacturers, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2005, at C3.
100 See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Suit Says Wal-Mart is Lax on Labor Abuses Overseas,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at C3.
1l1 See Kabel, supra note 98.
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creates results because the allegations garner public and private attention to
the cause of worker's rights.
Lawsuits such as the one discussed in this comment will continue to be
popular avenues for change, because even if a verdict is never reached, a
settlement can create lasting change. For example, as of March 2000,
seventeen retailers including Gap, J.Crew, and Nordstrom reached a
settlement with workers in Saipan for alleged violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.10 2 The settlement included some $8 million to finance an
independent monitoring program and to provide for partial damages to the
workers, public education, and costs and attorney's fees. 10 3  Although
settlement offers some positive solutions, a low minimum wage, a virtually
unlimited supply of labor from new workers, and the unwillingness of the
local government to enforce existing labor laws in the future will cause the
core problems to remain.1°4 In circumstances such as Wal-Mart's, the
question remains whether an independent contractor approved in a
settlement can effectively monitor hundreds of factories. The threat of new
litigation and public pressure seems like a more effective tool in bringing
about change.
Although lawsuits have been successful, some commentators question
whether the courts are the best venue to hold a retailer responsible for the
behavior of its suppliers. According to Susan Aaronson, director of the
Kenan Institute's Washington Center for Globalization Studies, "[t]he
government might be able to do more to promote responsible corporate
behavior.., by, for example, giving procurement preference to companies
that can demonstrate that their suppliers respect workers rights."'15 This
approach could lead to changes in corporate behavior similar to those that
were seen in the early 1990s after the changes in U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines gave incentives to companies that created codes of conduct.
Already some U.S. cities, such as San Francisco, are adopting anti-
sweatshop ordinances to prevent sweatshop labor abroad.10 6  San
Francisco's Board of Supervisors approved the measure requiring the city
only to use contractors that commit to safe, legal work environments and
provide fair wages. 10 7  Out of San Francisco's $600 million of annual
102 Deborah J. Karet, Comment, Privatizing Law on the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands: Is Litigation the Best Channel for Reforming the Garment Industry?, 48
BUFF. L. REV. 1047, 1080-81 (2000).
103 id.
"o See id. at 1084.
105 Molly Selvin, Wal-Mart Faces Suit by Labor Group, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at
C3 (quoting Susan Aaronson).
106 See Brendan Coyne, San Francisco Approves Anti-Sweatshop Ordinance,





contracting, only $2.1 million directly affects garments and textiles, which
would be the focus of the first year of the ordinance. °8 San Francisco's
Global Exchange's sweat-free campaign organizer, Valerie Orth, stated that
in passing the bill, "San Francisco will be setting the highest standard in the
country," and explained that "[u]pward of [seventy] anti-sweatshop
ordinances exist across the nation, but they fail to set such strict standards
and generally lack the means of enforcement."' 1 9 Although the ordinance
has ambitious goals, it will likely face the same challenges with
enforcement that other similar national legislation has faced. Still, the
strong language of the ordinance and its lofty goals are likely to send a
message to subcontractors who profit from selling goods to San Francisco.
Moreover, San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom is trying to convince other
mayors to pass similar legislation. In a letter sent to mayors across the
United States, Newsom encouraged other cities to enact legislation similar
to San Francisco in an effort to consolidate purchasing power and
coordinate enforcement across jurisdictional boundaries. 10 According to
Newsom's letter, a multi-jurisdictional legislative approach to preventing
sweatshop labor could prove a strong tactic in overcoming enforcement
obstacles. I l  Legislation could be an effective approach because it is
proactive rather than reactionary and gives corporations, local businesses,
and politicians an opportunity to win public favor.
In addition to legislation adopted by cities, other scholars argue that
bolstering international mechanisms already in place, such as the ILO, can
lead to successful reform of labor standards. F1 Traditionally, the ILO
adopted conventions that "created legally binding obligations and supported
a comprehensive program of labor standards."' 13  Following the 1995
World Summit on Social Development, the ILO adopted a new approach
that focused on promoting eight "core" labor conventions including:
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right
to collective bargaining;
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour;
(c) the effective abolition of child labour; and
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
108 Jo Stanley, S.F. Close in Anti-Sweatshop Rules, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 4, 2005,
available at http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/sweatshops/3380.html.
109 Camille T. Taiara, Sweating Slave Labor, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN, Aug. 10, 2005,
available at http://www.sfbg.com/39/45/news-sweatshops.html.
110 Letter from Gavin Newsom, Mayor, City and County of San Francisco (Nov. 17,
2005), http://www.sweatfree.org/docs/lettertomayors.pdf.
111 Id.
112 Developments in the Law-Jobs and Borders, supra note 16, at 2205.
113 Id.
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occupation."1
4
Proponents of making labor reforms through the ILO want to utilize
the core conventions in order to include "stronger labor provisions in
preferential trade agreements that encourage the reform of domestic labor
laws as necessary to guarantee fundamental workers rights."' 15 However,
this objective could prove more difficult than traditional litigation,
considering that the United States remains one of only seven countries that
has ratified two or fewer core conventions, and that as of 2005 fewer than
sixty percent of ILO member countries had ratified all eight core
conventions." 6
Reform resulting from grass-roots pressure seems more likely to
succeed than ILO reform. During the week of November 13, 2005, a
coalition of more than four hundred national and local groups, spearheaded
by Wal-MartWatch, an umbrella group started early in 2005 by maverick
union leader Andy Stem, mounted hundreds of actions nationwide against
Wal-Mart, calling the week of action "Higher Expectations Week.''
117
According to Wal-MartWatch Executive Director Andy Grossman, the goal
of the campaign was "to use a wide range of grass-roots actions to raise
awareness of the problems Wal-Mart causes for our society."" 8 Although it
is too soon to measure the impact of the week of action, the sheer volume of
participants will likely cause concern for Wal-Mart. Grass-roots pressure
against Wal-Mart even includes a "Wal-Mart Sweatshop Workers Speaking
Tour" in which former workers of Wal-Mart's foreign suppliers speak
about their experiences at scheduled visits to various college campuses, and
an e-mail campaign in which individuals can send e-mails directly to Wal-
Mart executives, presumably to express concern." 9 According to ILRF, the
goal of the speaking tour and an e-mail campaign is to "hold Wal-Mart
accountable." 20 Similar to the role that litigation plays in garnering Wal-
Mart's attention and reaction, this grass-roots action could push Wal-Mart
to reform if its executives are leery of seeing the company's values-rich
reputation diminished. However, it is questionable how much a speaking
tour at various prestigious universities and e-mail campaign will truly
"14 A. Trebilcock, The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
and its Follow-up, in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS: A GLOBAL APPROACH 18 (2002).
115 Developments in the Law-Jobs and Borders, supra note 16, at 2223.
116 Id. at 2206-07.
117 Aaron Bernstein, A Stepped-Up Assault on Wal-Mart, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Oct. 20,
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tm?chan=search.
118 Id.
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impact Wal-Mart's consumers. Arguably, Wal-Mart will not sincerely react
beyond mere lip service until the primary consumer becomes negatively
affected to the extent that he or she no longer wants to shop at Wal-Mart.
For that reason, litigation is still a necessary part of any grass-roots
campaign because it gives a larger voice to a small group of activists.
Although this type of grass-roots movement has been effective in the
past, even against Wal-Mart in the case of the Kathie Lee Gifford
sweatshop claims of the early 1990s, 121 the threat of costly litigation still
seems to be the most pervasive and effective tool for reform. Ultimately
litigation, especially if spearheaded by a grass-roots organization, can have
the double effect of changing public opinion while also hitting the
corporation where it truly matters-in its pocket books. In addition,
litigation, like that in Unocal or Saipan, demonstrates that even when a
company denies wrongdoing, the mere continued threat of litigation and the
negative stigma it creates can be enough to settle a case. In some cases,
litigation can even create lasting reform, as Wal-Mart's CEO demonstrated
with his recent public comments about stepping up supplier standards.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although Wal-Mart is not likely to be found liable for breach of
contract in the present matter, the relevance of this suit goes beyond any
court ruling. As globalization increases and MNCs increasingly expand
their operations into foreign countries, they are more, not less, likely to face
similar suits from labor groups, NGOs, and foreign workers who want to
force corporations to be accountable for what takes place on foreign soil.
Although MNCs like Wal-Mart may be able to avoid some suits, they will
not be able to avoid them all. Ultimately, MNCs will have to be proactive
with their own enforcement and monitoring mechanisms if they wish to
avoid the perpetual onslaught of public criticism.
121 Complaint, supra note 1, at 13.
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